In the past few hours, there have been over 70 attempts at spoofing the two-factor authentication for my account.
In my effort to change my account password, to stop this, I have been faced with what is one of the most anti-user account security systems I can recall, which is possibly even more of a risk to Epic account holders than a hacking effort is - because the Epic system is designed to expose a legitimate user as much as possible, while giving them little to no recourse to do anything about a hack, or to retrieve their account if it is stolen.
First, I’ll start with one of the most absurd issues with the Epic account security system: Why do you broadcast the email address that the 2-factor authentification code is sent to? That’s incredibly stupid. Now one of my email addresses is known to some lame fail-hacker somewhere in the world.
Why not censor part of the email, like other sites do?: liv*******@****.com
That would protect the user’s privacy and security, and frustrate any further hacking efforts against other accounts - while accomplishing the goal of informing the account holder of where to get their 2FA information.
Now, even after a person has their 2FA information, how can a person log into their own account to change the password to prevent someone who’s trying to hack it from getting into it, when it takes about a half hour or longer for the two-factor authentification code to be sent to the person’s email, and there’s somebody constantly trying to brute-force the 2FA, using the current password each time, and resetting what the 2FA is with each log-in attempt? Again, stupid design.
After a certain number of log-in attempts, like 5, an account should be locked, and only unlockable from an email that is sent to the person that the account belongs to. Or, no new log-ins should be possible for a set number of hours, while the last 2FA password sent to the account email may still be used - giving the person who own the account time to use it to log into their account without the 2FA code constantly changing. Each 2FA code should have a working duration of at least 5 minutes after it’s RECEIVED.
Next with the Epic account security system: Oh, and did I say it takes over a half hour to receive the 2FA code? My mistake - it’s been over 1.5 hours now, and I haven’t yet received a single 2FA code from the location I’m in - but I’ve received over 60 from locations in Russia, which weren’t generated by my own request for a 2FA code. By the way, I changed my Epic account password over 10 minutes ago, and I’m still receiving 2FA codes in my email. Also, I still haven’t received a single 2FA code from my actual location.
Now, the next glaring with the Epic anti-user account system: When all efforts by a person to log-in to their account fails, or if a person’s account is hijacked and its password changed, how is the person supposed to contact Epic support for assistance in retrieving their account? All Epic support options require being signed into a person’s account. Therefore, if a person is locked out of their account, they’re also locked out of support contact options to get help with their account. Like previous aspects of Epic’s account system design, this part defies all logic. And Epic cannot even be contacted from their Facebook page, or elsewhere that I’ve seen (and I searched).
So, the requirement for people to get support from Epic regarding their account security is that they don’t require support from Epic regarding their account security in the first place.
Create a support contact form on the Epic Games main website that allows a person to fill out and submit the form using just an email address for the return contact. Better yet, have an online chat support system that people can use WITHOUT needing them to be logged into their account to use it.
And another amateur with Epic’s account so-called security system: How is it that your account so-called security system does not identify a hacking effort when there are dozens of account log-in attempts, with each being from a unique IP address? Shouldn’t any sensible system recognize, after maybe 3 - 4 log-in attempts within 30 minutes, each with a different IP address, that somebody is trying to hack the account, using IP-address spoofing?
Here are the IP addresses that have been used to request a 2FA code for my account in the last few hours (only one of them is not from Russia, and is instead from France):
37.18.42.16 in Russia.
146.185.202.20 in St Petersburg, Russia.
185.13.33.118 in Russia.
185.101.69.94 in Russia.
91.243.91.52 in St Petersburg, Russia.
37.230.212.76 in Russia.
95.181.217.34 in Russia.
178.57.65.162 in Russia.
185.223.164.34 in Moscow, Russia.
5.101.218.50 in Rostov-on-Don, Russia.
185.223.164.150 in Moscow, Russia.
5.8.37.6 in St Petersburg, Russia.
185.101.68.144 in Russia.
95.181.217.221 in Russia.
37.18.42.43 in Russia.
141.101.201.45 in Russia.
95.181.183.107 in Russia.
5.188.217.38 in St Petersburg, Russia.
37.9.41.147 in St Petersburg, Russia.
79.133.107.133 in Russia.
185.13.33.176 in Russia.
146.185.202.99 in St Petersburg, Russia.
46.161.63.254 in Nizhniy Novgorod, Russia.
5.62.155.129 in Russia.
5.62.152.151 in Russia.
5.8.37.6 in St Petersburg, Russia.
185.223.160.126 in Moscow, Russia.
178.57.65.194 in Russia.
185.223.160.83 in Moscow, Russia.
5.62.157.107 in Paris, France.
185.89.101.134 in Moscow, Russia.
185.13.33.126 in Russia.
185.89.101.25 in Moscow, Russia.
46.161.63.135 in Nizhniy Novgorod, Russia.
91.243.93.48 in St Petersburg, Russia.
91.243.91.38 in St Petersburg, Russia.
146.185.202.118 in St Petersburg, Russia.
146.185.202.104 in St Petersburg, Russia.
193.93.195.89 in St Petersburg, Russia.
193.93.195.22 in St Petersburg, Russia.
193.93.193.15 in St Petersburg, Russia.
146.185.202.118 in St Petersburg, Russia.
46.161.62.183 in St Petersburg, Russia.
185.101.69.201 in Russia.
185.223.160.231 in Moscow, Russia.
5.8.37.19 in St Petersburg, Russia.
5.62.154.162 in Kaluga, Russia.
37.18.42.48 in Russia.
79.110.31.43 in Moscow, Russia.
5.62.155.103 in Russia.
193.93.194.145 in St Petersburg, Russia.
5.62.152.107 in Russia.
185.101.71.79 in Russia.
178.159.97.79 in Moscow, Russia.
37.230.212.195 in Russia.
91.243.90.160 in Kaluga, Russia.
178.57.67.130 in Russia.
37.230.212.14 in Russia.
91.204.15.97 in Moscow, Russia.
193.93.194.123 in St Petersburg, Russia.
37.9.40.129 in St Petersburg, Russia.
185.14.194.182 in Moscow, Russia.
79.133.106.157 in Russia.
193.93.195.110 in St Petersburg, Russia.
5.188.217.20 in St Petersburg, Russia.
185.101.69.141 in Russia.
193.93.193.248 in St Petersburg, Russia.
79.133.106.86 in Russia.
79.133.106.11 in Russia.
95.181.217.107 in Russia.
37.230.213.184 in Russia.
5.62.155.175 in Russia.
My account should have been locked down, rather than allowing this many number of unique IPs to be signing into my account within a short period of time.
Obviously, Epic’s account security system NEEDS a major revision - and Epic account holders need it to happen to know that their Epic account is adequately secure.